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SURROGACY FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF

ECONOMIC AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
Lawrence 0. Gostin*
The field of law and economics, of which Judge Posner is the leading
theorist, has offered a rich and sophisticated framework for thinking
about a wide variety of problems at the interface of law and society. The
theory, based on economic principles for understanding behavioral
incentives and disincentives, is widely taught in law schools and is
influential in scholarship. I have not always agreed with the application of
the theory to complex problems of individual and group behavior,' yet I
constantly have been impressed with the elegance of the writing and
analysis.
Judge Posner thinks about surrogacy arrangements in terms of
economic liberty: The parties are in relatively free and equal bargaining
positions, the arrangements are mutually beneficial, and third parties
(notably the children) are not harmed. My article is written from the
perspective of civil liberties rather than economic liberties. Do the two
perspectives-economic and civil liberties-lead to similar policy results?
For the most part, they do. Both perspectives defend surrogacy
arrangements, arguing that they should not be prohibited or significantly
restricted. The civil liberties approach, however, would not permit the
contract to require the gestational mother to waive her parental rights,
preferring that custody disputes be determined under a "best interests"
standard. Judge Posner would argue that this stipulation would make the
contract far less desirable to both parties-the prospective adoptive
parents would not be assured of a child and thus would be prepared to
pay less to the gestational mother. He argues that third party children are
not harmed because, absent the contract, they would not have been born.
I argue that the child, who is not a party to the contract, cannot be bought
and that the child's best interests should prevail.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Professor of Public Health, the
Johns Hopkins University; Director, CDC-Collaborating Center on Law & the
Public's Health. http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
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Both arguments are made in the name of freedom-one economic
liberty and the other personal liberty. Although these articles were
written when surrogacy arrangements were still a novelty, the arguments
still are salient and important.
The law relating to surrogacy arrangements has evolved since my
article was first written.2 A number of states adopted surrogacy laws,
most focusing on family law rather than contract law. For example, laws
in Michigan and Washington make determinations based on the child's
best interests.3 Virginia and New Hampshire require an extensive
screening process for unpaid surrogacy contracts which include
psychological and medical evaluations, approval by a judge in advance of
the pregnancy, and a home study of all parties to the surrogacy
arrangement to assure the child a good home.'
Generally, state statutes do not honor paid surrogacy contracts, and ten
states prohibit compensation of an intermediary.'
The District of
Columbia and Arizona ban surrogacy contracts.'
Florida, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, Washington and West
Virginia ban payments to surrogates, but have broad exceptions to allow
the payment of expenses
Some state statutes go to the issue of parental rights. For example,
New Hampshire and Virginia have a presumption that the contracting
couple is the parents, but allow the surrogate a period of time in which to
change her mind.8 In Arizona, North Dakota and Utah, the surrogate and
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her husband are the legal parents. 9 In Illinois, unless the child is
genetically that of the contractual couple, the surrogate and her husband
are presumed to be the legal parents. ° Illinois law also allows the
contracting couple's name to be placed on the birth certificate."
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